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T

here does not appear to be any dispute about the following facts
concerning the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln: that on 14
April 1865, while sitting in a box at Ford's Theater in Washington, D.C.,
watching a perfonnance of "Our American Cousin," Lincoln was shot and killed
by John Wilkes Booth; that in jumping from the box to the stage (where he
delivered the sic semper tyrannis pronouncement) one ofBooth's spurs caught on
a flag decorating Lincoln's box with the result that he fell and broke his leg; that
despite this he was able to escape from the theater and from Washington; that
he was later joined in his flight by David E. Herold; that Dr. Samuel Mudd, a
Booth acquaintance living in Maryland, treated Booth's leg and provided him
with a makeshift crutch; and that all this occurred five days after Lee's surrender
to Grant at Appomattox.
1
From that point on there is litde agreement on the facts --and even less on
the applicable law. However, as to some of the facts which are disputed, there
is really no basis for argument. For example, it is sometime argued that with
Lee's surrender the Civil War (or the War Between the States) came to an end.
That is not so. Lee had merely surrendered the Anny of Northem Virginia. The
Confederate States of America had other armies in the field, armies which
continued to fight, armies which did not surrender until well after the date of
the assassination? Moreover, because of the presence of thousands of
Confederate sympathizers in Washington, martial law had been declared for that
city, which was fortified and heavily guarded by Union troops, and that status
still existed on 14 April 1865, when the assassination took place.
The current manual on the law of war of the United States Anny defines a
war crime as "a violation of the law of war by any person or persons, military
or civilian ... 3 Adopting this definition, the sole question that this article will
attempt to answer is: Was the assassination of Abraham Lincoln by John Wilkes
Booth (and any co-conspirators) a violation of the law of war and, hence, a war
crime? To refine our discussion even further: Is the murder of an individual
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committed in wartime by one or more individuals of the same nationality as the
victim a war crime?
If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, under the law of war a
military commission would unquestionably have jurisdiction to try the accused
persons, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, brought before it charged with such an
offense. If the answer to these questions is in the negative, the question of the
jurisdiction of a military commission becomes one of constitutional and national
law which is beyond the purview of this discussion. 4
For our purposes we will assume the worst case for the accused: 1) that the
evidence established that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Lincoln;
2) that the eight individuals convicted by the military commission on 30 June
1865, including Dr. Samuel Mudd, as well as others who were not charged,
were parties to that conspiracy;5 3) that all of the conspirators charged, being
residents of the District of Columbia or of the State ofMaryland, were nationals
of the Union; 4) that, nevertheless, all of the conspirators were strong supporters
of the Confederate cause; and 5) that the conspiracy to assassinate Lincoln was
motivated by a desire on their part to help that cause. 6
The charge with respect to which the military commission opened its hearings
on 9 May 1865, and to which the eight accused pleaded "Not Guilty" on the
following day, alleged that they "maliciously, unlawfully and traitorously"
combined, confederated, and .conspired to kill and murder Abraham Lincoln
and others. 7 There is no allegation that their acts were in violation of the law
of war. The wording of the charge itself demonstrates that the prosecution
considered the offense charged to be a conspiracy to commit treason by
murdering the President and his successors-to-be and that it did not consider
this to be a war crime. 8 As the present author has said elsewhere: 9
There are a number of actions which, while they are wartime criminal offenses
and are punishable by the injured belligerent, do not come within any definition
ofwar crimes. Thus, while there is a wide-spread belief that espionage and treason
0
are violations of the laws and customs of war and are, therefore, war crimes, 1 this
is not so.ll Intemationallaw does not forbid espionage and treason; national laws
12
do.

Presumably, the accused, Union citizens, assumed their acts of assassination
would in some manner benefit the Confederate cause, even at that late date in
the war. Their acts were, therefore, traitorous-but, as it has just been shown,
treason is not a violation of the law of war, and it is not a war crime.
The post-World War II trials in which Germans tried Germans, Austrians
tried Austrians, Hungarians tried Hungarians, etc., were not true war crimes
trials. For the most part they were collaborationist (treason) cases and, in many
cases, prosecuted misuse or abuse of power. Nor were the euthanasia cases or
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the concentration camp cases (involving actions which took place prior to, and
after, 1 September 1939, the official date of the beginning of World War II in
Europe), which were tried by the Germans, true war crimes cases. They were
violations of German criminal law, which had existed at the time of the offenses,
but which, for obvious reasons, had not been enforced by Nazi officials. 13
In the Nordhausen Concentration Camp case, the review of the case contains
the following statement:
For an illegal act to be a war crime certain elements must be present, viz., (1) the
act must be a crime in violation of international law; (2) there must be a disparity
of nationality between the perpetrator and the victim; and (3) the criminal act
14
must have been committed as an incident ofwar.

These elements were not present in the trial of those alleged to have been parties
to the conspiracy to assassinate Abraham Lincoln. The act charged was not a
violation of international law; there was no disparity of nationality between the
persons charged as perpetrators and the victim; and it is extremely doubtful that
the assassination of Lincoln may be considered to have been an incident of the
war. Therefore, it was not a war crime.
Proponents of the argument that the law of war governed the assassination
of Abraham Lincoln, a Union citizen, by those who were likewise Union
citizens, will find support in the trial of Mariano Uyeki,15 a case for which the
present author can find no justification:
Mariano Uyeki was born in 1924 in Iloilo, Panay, the Philippines, of Japanese
parents. When the war broke out in 1941 he apparently suffered at the hands of
his Filipino schoolmates because he was pro-]apanese and it was alleged that on
10 May 1942, after the Japanese occupation ofPanay, and without any justification,
he shot and killed a fellow Filipino teenager. There was some evidence at that
period he was acting as an interpreter for the Japanese and that he was wearing at
least parts of a Japanese Army uniform. However, he was not conscripted into the
Japanese Army until October 1944. He became a prisoner of war on 1 September
1945. Early in 1946 he was tried for the murder by a United States Military
Commission. He was convicted and sentenced to death. That conviction was
vacated because "the validity o~the proceedings is faulty." Unfortunately, there
is no explanation of the basis for that statement. He then made an application to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that
he was a Filipino citizen and that the United States Military Commission had no
jurisdiction to try him. His application was denied on the ground that even ifhe
had originally been a national of the Philippines, he had forfeited that nationality
by rendering military service to the Japanese Government. This was not a decision
that the military commission had jurisdiction to try him, it was a decision that the
Supreme Court of the Philippines had no jurisdiction to rule on the jurisdiction
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of the United States court because he was not a citizen of the Philippines. He was
retried by another United States Military Commission in April 1946 and was again
convicted and sentenced to death. 16
Concerning this case the present author went on to say:
When the offense was conunitted in 1942, it was a matter of the murder of
one (pro-American) Filipino civilian by another (pro-Japanese) Filipino
civilian. It was a violation of the criminal law of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Surely, this was a case for the courts of the Philippines and not a
war crime for trial by a United States Military Conunission. Even though the
accused may have lost his Filipino nationality in 1944, upon entering the
Japanese Army, and even though the Philippines were not yet fully
independent, it did have its own fully-developed criminal justice system. It is
difficult to find a basis for the jurisdiction of the United States military
conunission for this offense conunitted in 1942. Regrettably, no afplication
for a writ of habeas corpus was made to the United States Courts. 1
In other words, it is not believed that motive alone can convert an offense
which is a violation of national law into one which is a violation ofintemational
law. Had Booth and his fellow conspirators been disappointed office seekers,
the assassination ofPresident Lincoln would certainly not have been a war crime,
and the fact that they acted as they did because of their political motivation,
because of their desire to support the Confederacy, does not convert a common
law national crime into an international crime.
The conclusion is reached that the assassination ofPresident Abraham Lincoln
by John Wilkes Booth and his fellow conspirators was not a violation of the law
of war and, therefore, was not a war crime, but was a politically motivated,
treasonous act committed by Union citizens in the hope that it would help the
Confederate cause. Accordingly, even ifwe assume that the evidence supported
Dr. Mudd's conviction of conspiracy to commit treason and murder under
national law, he was properly convicted only if a trial by military commission
at that time and place complied with the constitutional and statutory law of the
United States.
Notes
1. See OTTO EISENSCHIML, WHY WAS LINCOLN MURDERED? (1937) (discussing one extreme, and
perhaps discredited, version of the facts); WILLIAM HANCHETT, THE LINCOLN MURDER CONSPIRACIES (1983)
(containing a is-page bibliography and more scholarly discussion on the subject); see aho LoUISJ. WEICHMAN,
A TRUE HISTORY OF THE AssASSINATION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE CONSPIRACY OF 1865 (Floyd H.
Risvold ed., 1975) (setting forth the contents of a number of interesting documents).
2. For example, Confederate GeneralJoseph E. Johnston did not surrenderto Union General William
T. Sherman untll 18 April 1865. THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS
OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, ser. I, vol. XLVII, pt. III, 243-45 (Washington, GPO 1895).
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General Shennan was reprimanded for giving General Johnston what were considered to be excessively
favorable conditions for his surrender and the Federal Government repudiated the surrender agreement! !d.
at 301-02, 334-36, 345.
3. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL FM27-10, The Law of Land Warfare "II 499 ( 1956).
Much of this manual was the work of the late Richard R. Baxter, subsequendy the United States Judge on
the International Court ofJustice.
In amplification of the foregoing the present author has stated:
Anyone-military or civilian, man or woman, enemy nationals, allied nationals, and neutral
nationals-may commit a war crime and may be tried and punished for the criminal act.
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60 MARINE CORPS GAZETTE 16 (Aug. 1976),60 MARINE CoRPS GAZETTE 33 (Sept. 1976).
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of these was the trial of Captain Henry Wirz, who had commanded the notorious prisoner-of-war camp at
Andersonville, Georgia. See H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 23, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. (1867); 8 AMERICAN STATE
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Davis and members of the Confederate Cabinet. In fact, the charge (or indictment) includes their names and
the specification includes a statement to the effect that the conspirators were "incited and encouraged" by
Davis and other well known Confederates. However, no substantial evidence oftheir involvement was adduced
at the conspiracy trial. Davis was taken into Union custody on 10 May 1865, after the trial was under way,
and he was not brought before the Commission. He was released from custody in May 1867 without having
been tried for any offense.
7. BENN PITMAN, THE AsSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS
18-21 (New York, Moore, Wilstach & Baldwin 1865) (facsimile ed. 1954). This is the courtroom testimony
as recorded by Pitman, the official court reporter.
8. In Ex parle Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), where unlawful belligerents, including one individual who
claimed to be a citizen of the United States, had entered this country for purposes of espionage and sabotage,
the Court stated that "even when committed by a citizen, the offense [entering the country for the purpose
of committing sabotage while wearing civilian clothes] is distinct from the crime of treason ••. since the
absence of unifonn essential to one is irrelevant to the other." Id. at 38.
In other words, unlawful combatants wearing civilian clothes and bent on sabotage are in violation of the
law of war; inasmuch as only citizens can commit treason, their attire at the time of the commission of the act
is immaterial, and there is no unlawful combatancy involved.
9. LEVIE, supra note 3, at 3.
10. See, e.g., Iu. A. Reshetov, International Criminal Responsibility of Individualsfor International Crimes, in
THE NUREMBERG TRlAI.5AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 167 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990);
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